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ůĞĐƚŝŽŶ PZĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ 
 
Michael Thrasher, Galina Borisyuk, Colin Rallings, Ron Johnston and Charles Pattie 
 
Abstract 
Electoral bias results in an asymmetrical seat distribution between parties with similar vote shares.  
Over recent British general elections Labour held an advantage because it efficiently converted votes 
into seats.  Following the 2015 election result this advantage has reduced considerably, principally 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐǀŽƚĞĚŝƐƚribution saw it accumulate more ineffective votes, particularly where 
electoral support was not converted into seats.  By contrast, the vote distribution of the Conservative 
party is now superior to that of Labour because it acquired fewer wasted votes although Labour 
retains a modest advantage overall because it benefits from inequalities in electorate size and 
differences in voter turnout.  Features of the 2015 election, however, raise general methodological 
challenges for decomposing electoral bias.  The analysis, therefore, considers the effect of 
substituting the Liberal Democrats as the third party with the United Kingdom Independence Part. It 
also examines  the outcome in Scotland separately from that in England and Wales. Following this 
analysis it becomes clear that  the method for decomposing electoral bias requires clearer guidelines 
for its application in specific settings. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the three decades following World War II two parties predominated at general elections in Britain, 
securing over 90% of both the votes cast and seats in the House of Commons. From 1974 onwards 
the party system changed as three smaller parties then began to make an impact: in Scotland and 
Wales nationalist parties (the Scottish National Party  W SNP  W and Plaid Cymru, respectively) won a 
significant share of the votes there and some parliamentary seats; and across the whole of Great 
Britain, the Liberal party increased its share of both votes and seats. None of these three parties won 
a share of the seats commensurate with their vote share, however: the two largest parties  W 
Conservative and Labour  W still held most seats in the House of Commons even though their joint 
vote share declined. Great Britain essentially remained a two-party system, with much smaller third 
parties.
1
 
 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this discussion we omit any discussion of the situation in Northern Ireland where generally 
speaking, from 1974 onwards none of the Great Britain parties contested seats there and an entirely separate 
party system subsequently evolved. 
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That situation altered towards the end of the 20
th
 century as one of these smaller parties, the 
Liberals (and their successors; hereafter referred to by the name of the current party  W the Liberal 
Democrats), increased the number of seats won by focusing campaigning efforts on a small number 
of constituencies. By the start of the new century Britain appeared to be settling into more of a 
three-party system.  At the same time, two other smaller parties made an increasing impact in terms 
of vote share  W the Green party, which won a single seat in 2010; and the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) which first won a parliamentary seat at a 2014 by-election. 
 
This approximation to a three-party system with a number of smaller competitors (the SNP, Plaid 
Cymru, UKIP and the Greens) was substantially re-configured by the 2015 election result. The Liberal 
Democrats, capturing almost one in four votes cast and 57 seats at the previous election in 2010, 
saw vote share decline by two-thirds and seats reduced to just eight. The Greens and UKIP both 
increased vote shares substantially (to 4 and 13% respectively), but each won only a single seat; and 
Plaid Cymru retained its vote share (1% only of the Britain-wide vote; 12% in the 40 Welsh 
constituencies) and three House of ŽŵŵŽŶƐ ?ƐĞĂƚƐ ?And there was a major change in Scotland: in 
2010, the SNP won 2% of the votes (20% ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ? ?ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƐŝǆƐĞĂƚƐ ?ĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐ
later it won 5% of the national vote (but 50% of those cast in Scotland) and 56 seats. So the previous 
three-party system was transformed; two parties continued to dominate both vote share and the 
number of MPs (though less so than ever before in the latter case) and five other parties occupied 
lesser positions with four of these getting very few seats  W the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, UKIP 
and the Greens won just 13 seats (out of 631 contested across Great Britain) despite jointly winning 
more than a quarter of votes. 
 
Like most countries using a single-member plurality voting system Britain ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ have been 
characterised by disproportional outcomes, particularly so since the 1970s.  The extent of this 
disproportionality can be assessed for individual parties (the ratio between percentage seats and 
votes) and for the system as a whole using different measures (Taagepera and Laakso 1980, 
Grofman 1983; Gallagher 1991; Borisyuk et al. 2004).  What is less readily assessed ŝƐƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?Ɛ
bias. From the 1970s on, analysts noted that the various British parties were not treated equally in 
the translation of votes into seats (the classic work is Gudgin and Taylor, 1979; see also Rossiter et 
al., 1999, and Johnston et al, 2001): with the same share of the votes cast one party would obtain a 
larger share of the seats than its opponents. This became particularly clear at the 1997, 2001 and 
2005 general elections when it is estimated that the Labour party won 82, 141, and 111 more seats 
than the Conservatives would have done with the same vote shares at those three contests 
(Johnston et al. 2006). This pro-Labour bias was evaluated using a method developed for analysing 
bias in two-party systems, as discussed below, but became less valid to the evolving three-party 
situation: this was eventually addressed by extending the method so that it could be used for three-
party systems, with analyses of bias focussing upon the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat 
parties (see ĂůƐŽĂůǀŽĂŶĚZŽĚĚĞŶ ?Ɛrecent extension (2015) ŽĨ'ƵĚŐŝŶĂŶĚdĂǇůŽƌ ?ƐĐůĂƐƐŝĐǁŽƌŬƚŽ
that three-party situation). 
 
The 2015 election result presents a new and different challenge when decomposing electoral bias, 
however, because there is no longer a clear third party (see Table 1).  In terms of overall vote share, 
UKIP came third and the Liberal Democrats  W traditionally the third party W only fourth, although the 
Liberal Democrats did win seven more seats than UKIP.  Additionally, there are now major 
differences across the country: the SNP is clearly the first party in Scotland with Labour relegated 
into second place.  What then, is the most appropriate way of measuring bias following an outcome 
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that is as diverse as the 2015 result?  Does the collapse of the Liberal Democrats mean that it is now 
best conceptualised as a largely two-party system or does the three-party method remain valid in so 
far as it helps to explain how bias altered between the 2010 and 2015 elections?  Is there an 
argument for replacing the Liberal Democrats with UKIP as ƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞ
to win seats?  And is it still valid to address bias distribution across the whole system when the result 
in Scotland is so different to that elsewhere?  Such questions are of broader interest and raise 
methodological challenges for the study of electoral bias. 
 
The article begins with a brief outline of what electoral bias means and the different components 
that contribute towards it.  Next, there is a more detailed summary of the 2015 general election 
result which highlights how the particular vote and seat distributions now raise important questions 
about the method for understanding bias.  The subsequent analysis of that bias takes three different 
perspectives.  First, we measure bias components according to the three-party method, continuing 
to identify the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats as the parties of interest.  Second, we 
substitute the Liberal Democrats with UKIP in order to gauge the effect of introducing a third party 
that wins votes but not seats.  Finally, we consider the implications of departing from the standard 
practice of examining bias across the whole country and instead view it across two separate 
geographies, namely Scotland versus England and Wales.   
 
Decomposing electoral bias 
 
As stated earlier, electoral bias becomes evident when similar parties (in terms of vote share) are 
affected by the voting system in dissimilar ways.  A method for de-composing bias for a two-party 
system was developed by Ralph Brookes (1960) and later adapted to take account of party systems 
with two main parties and a third party winning some seats (Johnston et al. 1999)
2
.  Next, a more 
substantive adaptation permitted bias decomposition for a three-party system (Borisyuk et al. 2008; 
2010).  Detailed descriptions of the method and how it is applied may be found in those publications 
and only a broad outline is provided here. 
 
Brookes contended that the factors where one party was favoured over another could be separately 
identified and their overall effects upon the election outcome calibrated in terms of relative 
advantage in seat distribution.  There are four factors involved and these relate to: vote distribution 
 ?ŽĨƚĞŶƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ ‘ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ?ĨŽƌ each party across those constituencies where it stands 
candidates; inequalities in the ƐŝǌĞŽĨĞĂĐŚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ  ? ‘ŵĂůĂƉƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?; electoral 
turnout in constituencies (although Brookes ? preferred term is  ‘ĂďƐƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?; and finally, the impact 
of minor parties.  Additionally, the method allows for and calculates net interaction effects between 
these four components.  The size of the various bias components are shown as either positive or 
negative whole integers  W a party that benefits by winning many of its seats in low turnout 
constituencies, for example, would probably be shown to have a positive bias from this effect.  The 
nature and direction of overall bias in the system is shown by simply summing the positive and 
negative measures on each component for each party.  /ŶƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƌŽŽŬĞƐ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇƚŽ
a three-party system, the same approach is deployed.   
                                                          
2
 Soper and Rydon (1958) develop another method for considering bias.   
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Overview of the 2015 general election 
 
At the 2015 general election the Conservative party increased its representation by 24 to 330 seats 
(an 8% increase), ŐŝǀŝŶŐŝƚĂŽŵŵŽŶƐ ?majority of twelve,3 although its vote share rose by less than 
one percentage point (Table 1).  Despite polling three-quarters of a million more votes than it did in 
2010 the Labour party suffered a net loss of 26 seats.  The fraction of voters supporting the two 
main parties combined changed only slightly between the two elections while the proportion of 
Conservative and Labour MPs in the new Parliament remained as it was before the election.   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Although ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƐĞĂƚƐǁŽŶďǇƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ďŝŐƚǁŽ ?is unchanged its 
distribution is not with the Liberal Democrats and the SNP exchanging positions.  The Liberal 
Democrats lost 49 of their 57 seats but the SNP won 56 seats, an increase of 50 from the previous 
election.  Labour is the principal victim of ƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ ?Ɛ advance in Scotland, losing all but one of 
its former 41 seats; the Liberal Democrats lost ten of their eleven Scottish seats to the SNP.  A third 
feature of 2015 lay with UKIP which supplanted the Liberal Democrats as the third most popular 
party (almost four million votes nationwide) but also set an unenviable record for a party winning 
the highest vote share for lowest return in seats  W over one in eight votes were cast for 624 UKIP 
candidates but only one of these (Douglas Carswell in Clacton) was elected.  The Green party 
retained its single seat but acquired 1.2 million votes across the 573 seats that it contested.  With 
the Liberal Democrats slumping to fourth place, the combined vote for the three traditional Britain-
wide parties was 77%, by some distance the lowest in British electoral history. 
 
The 2015 election provides a clear example of plurality voting favouring large parties  W with 37% of 
the UK-wide vote the Conservatives obtained more than half the seats while Labour too won a larger 
proportion of seats than votes.  Plurality systems may also benefit smaller parties that focus on 
specific geographies; in 2015 the SNP won almost 9% of the seats with under 5% of the national 
vote, by any standard an unusually large seat/vote ratio.  Smaller parties whose vote is broadly 
distributed are disadvantaged by the voting system; in 2015 one in four votes were cast for the 
Liberal Democrats, UKIP and the Greens combined but those parties won just ten seats overall.   
 
Evidence of the dramatic change at the constituency level is revealed in Table 2.  The first column 
shows the winning party and each row identifies the party that finished in the runner-up position.  
The configuration of first and second places has an important bearing upon bias distribution.  In 
2015, Labour came second in 207 constituencies that returned a Conservative MP  W 63% of cases (in 
2010 it finished as runner-up in just 137 of the 306 Conservative seats, or 45%).  Conservative 
candidates finished in second place ŝŶ ? ? ?ŽĨ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƐĞĂƚƐ ?Žƌ72% of the total won (as against 147 
                                                          
3
 In effect the majority is slightly larger as the four Sinn Féin MPs do not take their seats. 
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of 258 seats  W 57%  W in 2010).  In many parts of the country, therefore, the 2015 election marked the 
return of a more clearly defined battle between the two largest parties (Johnston et al. 2016). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The Liberal Democrats not only lost seats, but finished in second place in just 63 constituencies 
(compared to 243 in 2010); they were placed fourth in almost ten times as many constituencies 
(338) as they were placed third (36).  By contrast, UKIP finished in second place in 120 constituencies 
 W 44 of them Labour-held; in 2010 the party came second in a single constituency. Scotland, of 
course, represents a special case not only because a single party won so emphatically there but also 
because Labour finished second in 73% of the 56 seats secured by the Nationalists.   
 
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the distribution of votes and seats following the 2015 election are 
substantially different than previously and justifies our approach in assessing electoral bias from a 
number of perspectives.  These are: first, the standard three-party approach of considering the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties (thereby facilitating direct comparisons with the 
outcome at the 2010 election); a second approach which substitutes UKIP for the Liberal Democrats 
as the third party; and finally separate assessments that acknowledge territorial differences between 
Scotland and England/Wales. 
 
 
Decomposing three-party bias 
 
It was the emergence of the Liberal Democrats as a significant electoral force that prompted the 
need to de-compose three- rather than two-party bias.  Although ƌŽŽŬĞƐ ?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŵĞƚŚŽĚrequired 
extension his original approach that the actual election outcome should be compared to a  ‘notional ? 
election was retained.  In the case of two parties competing this effectively means reversing the vote 
shares obtained by each party in addition to the actual election outcome.  It is the combination, or 
 ‘superposition ?, of the actual election with this notional election that becomes the norm for 
comparison that provides the expected unbiased number of seats for each party (Borisyuk et al 
2010).   
 
Of course, when three parties are competing the procedure becomes slightly more complex to 
operationalise, although the guiding principle is the same.  Consider three parties, A, B and C ranked 
in order of their finishing electoral ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŽǀĞƌĂůůǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞƐ ?ɲ ?ɴ ?ĂŶĚɶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
 ?ɲA?ɴ A?ɶA? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞfor assembling the superposition then considers all six possible 
configurations for these parties  W the actual finishing position (ABC) together with five further 
notional elections, viz., ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB and CBA (Borisyuk et al. 2010, pp 738-739 but see Blau 
2001 for criticisms of the application of swing in simulated elections of this type). For each of these 
configurations the vote share of the largest, second and third parties are fixed at the level of the 
actual election.  The configuration BCA, for example, represents a notional election in which party B 
instead becomes the largest party receiving ɲ% share of the vote.  Correspondingly, parties C and A 
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ĨŝŶŝƐŚƐĞĐŽŶĚǁŝƚŚɴ% ĂŶĚƚŚŝƌĚǁŝƚŚɶ% of votes respectively.  Following this procedure the method 
compares the actual number of seats won by each party with the expected unbiased number of 
seats obtained from construction of the norm of comparison that is derived from the superposition 
of the six separate configurations ABC ? ? ?, CBA.   
 
Decomposition of three-party bias for the 2015 general election is shown alongside that for the 
previous election (Table 3).  While the two main parties continue to benefit from the operation of 
ƚŚĞǀŽƚŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ party is now drastically 
reduced.  The bias disadvantage suffered by the Liberal Democrats is much smaller than it was in 
2010 but this is because the party attracted far fewer votes in 2015 and therefore its failure to 
capture seats becomes less about the operation of electoral bias and relates more to the expected 
vulnerability for a relatively small party with dispersed support.  Overall, there is less bias evident in 
the 2015 result (about 19 seats) compared to the 2010 outcome.  Indeed, across the eight general 
elections from 1983 onward the bias in 2015 is smaller than all others with the exception of 1997 
when Labour dominated (Johnston et al. 2012). Below, the separate bias components are examined 
in order to understand how this important transformation in the relative positions of the two main 
parties came about. 
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Geography 
 
The overall pro-Labour bias deriving from the vote distribution component amounts to 12 seats, 
double that of the Conservatives.  However, more interesting is that while the positive bias for the 
Conservatives halved in size between 2010 and 2015 there was a five-fold decrease for Labour.  The 
largest single element in this reduction waƐƚŚĞŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐǀŽƚĞ
distribution, which had given the party a 31-seat advantage in 2010 but now a deficit of ten seats; 
>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐǁĞƌĞŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚĂĐƌŽƐƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐŝĞƐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂŶ ? ? ? ?, in 
large part because of the many votes wasted in the 41 Scottish seats lost to the SNP.  The geography 
component also largely explains the small drop in overall bias favouring the Conservative party  W a 
36-seat advantage from 2010 reduces to 28 seats but this now gives the Conservatives a 
considerable edge in the efficiency of its vote distribution over Labour, a reverse of the pattern seen 
in the previous three elections (Thrasher et al. 2011; Johnston et al. 2012).  Indeed, almost half of 
the benefits accruing to the Conservatives from the geography component are derived from Labour
4
.  
^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐǀŽƚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝƐƉůĂǇŝŶŐƐƵĐŚa significant role in 
explaining the change in electoral bias it should be examined in more detail. 
 
If we assume that gathering support costs a party resources, the most efficient vote distribution 
under first-past-the-post is for each party to secure its victories without accumulating large 
                                                          
4
 As demonstrated in earlier papers (Borisyuk et al. 2008, 2010), it is possible to indicate for any bias 
component that advantages a party how much of that bias derives from comparing its position in terms of vote 
distribution/level of abstention /size of electorate/minor party votes with that of each of its opponents. 
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majorities. Strictly speaking, any majority larger than a single vote is comprised of  ‘ƐƵƌƉůƵƐ ?ǀŽƚĞƐ ?
Equally, for any party there is little point in gathering support in each constituency if the number of 
votes acquired falls short of the winning total; votes received in a lost cause are  ‘ǁĂƐƚĞĚ ?.  Parties 
that ignore both of these strategies accumulate  ‘ineffective ? votes (surplus and wasted votes 
combined). 
 
Table 4 itemises  ‘ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ǀŽƚĞ totals for the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties 
over three general elections in order to demonstrate how the pattern is changing.  It is clearly 
beneficial for a party to win seats with fewer votes than its rivals.  In this respect the trend for the 
Conservative party is in the right direction; it received an average of 34,214 votes per seat gained in 
2015 compared with 41,820 votes in 2005.  The Conservatives obtained about the same number of 
votes per seat won in 2015 as in 2010 but won an additional 24 seats with its performance: its vote 
distribution was clearly more efficient at the second of the two contests.  By contrast, for its two 
rivals (Labour and the Liberal Democrats) the pattern moves in the opposite direction with Labour at 
about forty thousand votes per seat won in 2015  W an almost 50% increase on its 2005 figure.  The 
trend for the Liberal Democrats describes a small third party losing its niche in a predominantly two-
party system. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The key to understanding how the Conservatives improved their relative position lies in comparing 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ineffective votes as a percentage of the votes per seats won.  The smaller that 
percentage, the more efficient ĂƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ vote distribution.  In 2015 this is 64% for the Conservatives, 
actually a small increase on the 2010 result.  For Labour, however, this percentage is rising, up from 
60% in 2005 to 73% in 2015 resulting in 6.8ŵŝůůŝŽŶŽĨ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƚŽƚĂů ? ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶǀŽƚĞƐcategorised as 
ineffective. For the Liberal Democrats, once celebrated for targeting votes, the 2015 election signals 
a clear failure; all bar 100,000 of its 2.4 million votes were ineffective.  
 
But why were Conservative votes more efficiently distributed in 2015 than their rivals ? Figures 1a-c, 
which show party vote share at the constituency level, provide a clearer explanation stemming from 
the particular distributions of surplus and wasted votes.  In each graph surplus votes acquired by the 
relevant party appear above the zero line while its wasted votes and the party winning the seat are 
shown ďĞůŽǁŝƚ ?dŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐǀŽƚĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇŚŽǁĐůŽƐĞŝƚƐ
constituency-level votes are adjacent to the zero line.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 1a thus describes the accumulation of wasted votes in the 330 seats won by Conservative 
candidates above the horizontal axis; below that line it shows the wasted votes in 301 constituencies 
where its candidate stood but lost.  Surplus Conservative votes for each constituency are ranked in 
order from the smallest majority to the largest.  The shading used for each bar (constituency) 
indicates the party coming second in the case of these Conservative seats  W Labour is dark grey, 
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Liberal Democrats are horizontally patterned and other parties (mainly UKIP) appear as light grey.  In 
124 of the Conservative seats (38%) the majority is under 10,000 votes while in only 69 cases (21%) 
does it rise above 20,000 votes.  Wasted votes accumulated by unsuccessful Conservative candidates 
are shown below the horizontal axis with the bar shading indicating the party that won the seat; 
ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĂƌĞ^EWǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐĂŶĚŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŽŶƐĞrvative candidates accumulated 
ǀĞƌǇĨĞǁ ‘ǁĂƐƚĞĚ ?ǀŽƚĞƐ here.  There are 130 constituencies (43% of the 301 seats where 
Conservative candidates were not elected) where losing Conservative candidates received 10,000 or 
more wasted votes.   
 
Comparison of the separate geographies of the Conservative and Labour vote reveals significant 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐǀŽƚĞis distributed more effectively than that of the Conservatives in terms of 
surplus votes.  /Ŷ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛvictories almost half of the 232 seats has a majority of under 10,000 votes 
whereas in just over 10% of its seats does the majority exceed 20,000 votes.  Labour clearly had the 
ĞĚŐĞŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨ ‘ƐƵƌƉůƵƐǀŽƚĞƐ ? because it won fewer seats (relatively 
and absolutely) by large absolute margins.  In terms of  ‘ǁĂƐƚĞĚǀŽƚĞƐ ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ
reverse with the Conservatives having the better vote distribution.  In 83% of the 301 seats it failed 
to win its candidate attracted the support of fewer than 15,000 voters, thereby curbing its 
accumulation of wasted votes.  For Labour the corresponding percentage is much lower  W in only 
two-thirds of the constituencies it lost did the party garner fewer than 15,000 votes.  In short, in 
respect of ineffective votes in a first past the post voting system, while Labour was better than the 
Conservatives at following the strategy of  ‘ǁŝŶƐŵĂůů ?it waƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ůŽƐŝŶŐďŝŐ ? ?
 
Given that the Liberal Democrats were reduced to just eight seats it seems more appropriate to 
ignore surplus votes (only in party leader dŝŵ&ĂƌƌŽŶ ?ƐƐĞĂƚŽĨtĞƐƚŵŽƌůĂŶĚĂŶĚ>ŽŶƐĚĂůĞwas there 
a significant number) and focus instead on wasted votes.  In 57% of the 623 constituencies where it 
lost, the party attracted more than 10,000 votes while there are 186 (30%) constituencies where 
wasted votes exceeded 15,000 votes.  It is unsurprising that the geography component in general, 
and wasted votes in particular, account for virtually ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞďŝĂƐ in 2015. 
 
Another important feature of vote distribution is whether or not a party converts its constituency 
support into victory.  Figures 2a-c demonstrate that capacity for victory where each column 
represents a parliamentary constituency and vote share (ranked from lowest to highest) received by 
the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties respectively.  Dark bars indicate that the seat 
was won  W any party obtaining over half the votes is assured of victory, of course.  Dashed horizontal 
lines identify a critical boundary where the party receives between 30-40% of the constituency vote 
ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐĞŐŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐǀŽƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĞǆƚƌĂĐƚĞĚĂŶĚŵĂŐŶŝĨŝĞĚƚŽ
improve visual inspection of seats won or lost. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
A crucial feature of the 2010 result ǁĂƐ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌĂďŝůŝƚǇin converting vote share into 
victories.  Then, it captured 57 out of 148 seats (39%) where its candidate polled between 30-40% of 
the constituency vote (Thrasher et al. 2011, p 290).  By contrast, only a quarter of Conservative 
candidates and only one in eight Liberal Democrats secured victory in the same circumstances.  It is 
immediately clear from Figure 2b that in 2015 Labour lost this significant advantage, winning just 20 
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of the 117 seats in the critical range (and most of these were very close to the 40% boundary), under 
half its success rate of five years earlier.  The Conservatives fared better than Labour in converting 
votes to seats in 2015 although slightly less well than was the case five years before: a party is more 
likely to win a seat with 30-40% of the votes if two opponents perform relatively well  W such as 
Labour and UKIP in many Conservative-won seats in 2015.  It is scant consolation for the Liberal 
Democrats that their success rate in 2015 was better than in 2010. 
 
 
Malapportionment 
 
Table 3 revealed that the Conservatives suffered from malapportionment (a negative bias of eight 
seats) but, historically, the negative bias for the Conservatives following boundary changes 
implemented for the 1983, 1997 and 2010 elections (-9, -10 and -7 seats respectively) is of similar 
magnitude to the -8 seats in 2015.  In other words, because the electorate figures used by the 
various boundary reviews are already out of date when the final recommendations are presented 
the rate of demographic change (and the extent to which it adversely impacts upon the 
Conservatives) means that it is not necessarily guaranteed that the malapportionment bias is 
removed entirely by boundary changes. /ŶĂŶǇĐĂƐĞ ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĨƌŽŵ ‘ĐƌĞĞƉŝŶŐ
ŵĂůĂƉƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĞĂƌůŝĞƌĚĞĐĂĚĞƐůĞĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵǁŝƚŚƐŵĂůůĞƌ-than-average sized constituencies 
as ƚŚĞŵĂƉ ‘ĂŐĞĚ ?ŝƐŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĨĞǁer major inner city clearance schemes 
with many such areas now being re-populated. 
 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 describes the range of electorates in seats won by the three parties in 2015. The mean 
electorate is highest in Conservative seats and lowest across the eight constituencies won by a 
Liberal Democrat.  The maximum electorate for the Conservatives (108,804) is the Isle of Wight 
constituency.  The low mean electorate figure for the Liberal Democrats is clearly affected by the 
inclusion of Orkney and Shetland, which had under thirty five thousand electors.  Recalculating the 
Liberal Democrat figures without this constituency takes the mean electorate to nearer seventy 
thousand electors.  dŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŵŽĚĞƐƚĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞďŝĂƐĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
reduced had it lost the Orkney and Shetland seat. 
 
 
Abstention 
 
Abstention bias traditionally favours Labour because its MPs are more likely to be elected in low 
turnout constituencies.  Turnout across Britain in 2015 (at 66%) showed only a marginal increase on 
the previous election but >ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞfrom this bias component rose from 13 to 16 seats.  
This is just short of the 18 seat pro-Labour bias that followed the record low general election turnout 
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in 2001.  Conversely, the relatively high turnout across Conservative-won seats and especially in the 
strong competition encountered in Liberal Democrat constituencies, meant that abstention bias was 
negative for both  W -12 seats for the former and -4 seats in the latter case.  The last four general 
elections have seen the abstention component disadvantage the Conservatives in the range of 11-14 
seats. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 shows percentage turnout in seats won by the main parties.  The mean turnout in 
Conservative seats was seven points higher than in Labour seats.  The SNP performance largely 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶŵĞĂŶƚƵƌŶŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ?.  
 
Minor party votes and net interaction effects 
 
Geography, electorate size and abstention often account for most of the electoral bias but the 
Brookes method also measures the impact of minor party votes as well as net interaction effects 
between separate components.  In the case of the standard three-ƉĂƌƚǇŵĞƚŚŽĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝŶŽƌ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ
include the nationalist parties, Greens, UKIP etc.  The bias from this component in 2015 is extremely 
small, with Conservatives and Liberal Democrats advantaged by just one seat each and Labour 
disadvantaged by two seats.  The net interaction effects are also small but the Conservatives have a 
negative bias of 5 seats (most likely as a result of high turnout in constituencies with over-sized 
electorates).   
 
A new three-party system? 
 
An alternative approach to the standard three-party bias decomposition is to substitute UKIP for the 
Liberal Democrats while retaining the Conservative and Labour parties.  Although only one UKIP 
candidate was successful, ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛnational vote share places it third, five percentage points 
ahead of the Liberal Democrats.  An ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨh</W ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ is its impact upon the 
traditional three-party vote of Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  Between 1992 and 
2010 these parties occupied the top three positions in order of vote in 98-99% of all constituencies 
across England.  In 2015 only 55 constituencies, 10.3% of the total, follow this pattern.  Instead, 
some 416 (78%) English constituencies, had Conservative, Labour and UKIP candidates finish in the 
top three places. 
 
The method proceeds as before but instead uses the distributions of the combined Conservative, 
Labour and UKIP vote shares to establish the norm of comparison.  Following this procedure, Table 7 
describes the various bias components and shows Labour, with a net positive bias of 38 seats, as the 
clear beneficiary when UKIP is treated as the third party.  The system appears neutral for the 
Conservatives but there is a clear negative bias of 28 seats for UKIP, virtually all of which stems from 
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its poor vote distribution which assists mostly Labour but the Conservatives also.  >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
advantage is consolidated by electorate and abstention bias components relative to the 
Conservatives.  UKIP failed to concentrate its support, something which smaller parties in a plurality 
system must do in order to secure seats (on which see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). The mean 
constituency vote share for UKIP candidates was 13%, close to its national vote share, and there is 
only a marginal rise to an average of 19% in the 120 constituencies where UKIP finished second. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
How does this approach to three-party bias compare with the earlier analysis?  One important 
consequence of choosing UKIP as the third party is that the bias components no longer sum to zero 
where total positive bias is (more or less) equal to negative bias.  The reason for this is that when the 
three-party bias method constructs the norm of comparison it comprises six scenarios.  It was not 
envisaged when the new method was being developed ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐĞĂƚƐǁŽŶďǇ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?
parties would vary across these scenarios.  In fact, given the electoral arithmetic of the 2015 election 
this is precisely what is happening after UKIP is incorporated ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂů
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐĂƌĞƌĞůĞŐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŬƐŽĨ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?hŶĚĞƌŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚre-configurations of the actual 
ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƐĞĂƚƐ ‘ǁŽŶ ?ďǇƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐƌŝƐĞƐ
substantially.   The same problem does nŽƚĂƌŝƐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐǀŝĐƚŽƌŝĞƐƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
these wins are geographically located and are by relatively high margins.   
 
The effect of using UKIP in this manner serves to highlight the fact that ƌŽŽŬĞƐ ? approach to bias 
decomposition is concerned with determining the efficiency of the translation of votes into seats 
ĂŶĚh</W ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞǁŝƚŚƐƵĐŚĂƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůĂƌŐĞǀŽƚĞƚŽƐĞĐƵƌĞŽŶůǇĂƐŝŶŐůĞƐĞĂƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚ
probably does not function as it was originally intended.   
 
Electoral bias across different geographies 
 
hƐĞŽĨƌŽŽŬĞ ?ƐƚǁŽ-party analytical procedure assumes that the ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?Ɛtwo largest parties occupy 
the first two places in most constituencies. This applied to Great Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, but 
not thereafter, hence the need to expand the method for three parties. Even so this has its 
drawbacks because  W as Johnston and Pattie (2011) observed  W very few indeed of the seats 
contested at the elections from 1974 to 2010 inclusive had three (or even four in the case of Scottish 
and Welsh constituencies) parties strongly contesting the constituency: almost all were  W in effect  W 
two-party contests, with different pairs of parties occupying the first and second places in different 
parts of the country and the third party  W Conservative in some areas, Labour in others, and the 
Liberal Democrats in a third group  W presenting no challenge to the two others.  
 
The situation after the 2015 election is even more complex.  At the 2010 contest, almost all of the 
British constituencies fell into one of four groups: those with the Conservative and Labour 
candidates occupying the first two places (284 seats): those with the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties in those positions (205 seats): those where Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
came either first or second (92 seats); and those where the first two places were occupied by Labour 
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and SNP candidates (30 seats).  In 2015 those same four categories contained 375, 50, 11 and 42 
seats respectively. In addition there were 76 seats where the Conservative and UKIP candidates 
occupied the first two places and 44 seats where they were occupied by Labour and UKIP 
candidates. In many of these seats UKIP  was not far ahead of the third-ƉůĂĐĞĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ
(Johnston et al., 2016) so that tŚĞƐĞŶĞǁ ‘ƚǁŽ-ƉĂƌƚǇƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?ǁĞƌĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌ
ƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďŝĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ? 
 
This geography of different competition types raises ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚĂ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďŝĂƐ ? 
This becomes readily apparent in the case of ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ^EW ?ƐǀŝƌƚƵĂůŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇin 2015 
made the situation there very different from the outcome across the rest of Great Britain.  Although 
SNP members easily comprise the third largest grouping in the new Parliament its national vote 
share is less than half that of UKIP since it only stood 59 candidates.  Clearly, it is impractical to 
regard the SNP as a Britain-wide party and for this part of the analysis, therefore, we analyse bias 
across two separate geographies, Scotland and England/Wales.  In the case of Scotland we focus on 
the three largest parties there in order of vote share, SNP, Labour and Conservative (Table 8). 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
First and foremost, Scotland illustrates how disproportionality differs from electoral bias.  The SNP 
received half the votes cast and yet won 95% of the seats, a clear example of the exaggerated 
 ‘ǁŝŶŶĞƌ ?ƐďŽŶƵƐ ?ƵŶĚĞƌplurality voting (as initially noted by Rae, 1967).  But there is also bias in the 
Scottish outcome with the SNP receiving a positive bias of four seats (after rounding).  This may not 
seem like a large number but it must be remembered that there are only 59 seats in Scotland and 
therefore those four seats represent about 15% of the total; scaled up to the House of Commons the 
bias would be approximately 90 seats. 
 
Removing Scotland also has quite a dramatic impact on the level of pro-Labour positive bias in the 
rest of Britain.  Instead of a negative bias from the geography component Labour now has an 
advantage of five seats.  The simple explanation for this change from the general picture is that 
Labour is disadvantaged across Great Britain as a whole by its accumulation of wasted votes in the 
Scottish seats it lost to the SNP.  The remaining bias measures associated with malapportionment 
and abstention are largely unchanged and so this treatment of different geographies certainly puts 
into perspective how the Scottish outcome ĚĂŵĂŐĞĚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ overall position.  From the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŽŵƉŽƐŝŶŐďŝĂƐĂĐƌŽƐƐŶŐůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐseparately moves the party 
from a positive to a negative bias and thereby emphasises how the Conservative victory was assisted 
by >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ^ĐŽttish rout.  Again, it is the geography component that is key to understanding this 
change; the Conservatives ? positive bias of 28 seats reduces to 16 seats when England and Wales is 
considered.  By separating out the Scottish constituencies we also remove a distinct feature of the 
Conservative vote distribution in 2015, namely its wasted votes.  There are 34 constituencies in 
Britain where the Conservative vote share is 10% or lower and 25 of those cases are in Scotland.   
 
Conclusions 
 
13 
 
In terms of overall bias, about 19 seats, the 2015 result is one of the least biased since three-party 
competition became the norm in the early 1980s.  The main explanation for this lies with the 
collapse in vote and seats for the Liberal Democrats.  The most significant change from previous 
elections, however, is rather the relative positions of the two main parties.  This not only helps to 
explain how the Conservative party won its overall majority but also how it is favourably placed to 
defend that position at the next election.  After the 2010 general election Labour emerged with a 
net positive bias of 63 seats with the Conservatives benefitting by 13 seats, a gap of 50 seats 
between the two parties ?>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞďŝĂƐŚĂƐnow fallen to just 12 seats while the gap with 
the Conservatives has narrowed to only six seats.  It is now no longer the case that Labour enjoys a 
large in-built advantage over the Conservatives that would allow it to win a future election with a 
smaller share of the national vote than its rival.   
 
Previous analyses of three-party bias from the 1983 election onward show a consistently large 
advantage for Labour relative to the Conservative party.  The reason for this turnaround in relative 
fortunes is not because Labour has lost its advantage from lower turnout or from the failure of 
constituency boundaries to track demographic changes  W it retains those.  Rather, the explanation 
lies with the important changes in relative vote distributions.   
 
The 2010 election provided a breakthrough for the Conservatives because the party achieved a 
much more efficient vote distribution than previously and even managed to have a five seat 
advantage over Labour in the geography bias component.  That advantage now extends to 38 seats 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐŐŽŽĚĨŽƌƚƵŶĞ arose because of >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ
tendency to accumulate ineffective votes.  Although the distribution of >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛsurplus votes are 
superior to that of the Conservatives this does not counteract the impact of wasted votes, 
particularly in Scotland. 
 
Some features of the 2015 general election raise methodological issues for the decomposition of 
three-party bias.  The alternative analyses of bias, first with UKIP replacing the Liberal Democrats 
and then the separate treatments of Scotland and England/Wales, are useful tests of the procedure 
but reinforce rather than provide additional insight into the events of May 2015.  It is stating the 
obvious that given its substantial vote but a return of just one seat that the system is biased against 
UKIP.  Labour enjoys a positive bias when UKIP replaces the Liberal Democrats as the third party 
although the Conservatives too are advantaged in respect of vote distribution.  The separate 
treatments of Scotland, England and Wales confirm the damage done to Labour from its defeat in 
Scotland but that is already readily apparent from the level of wasted votes it acquired in 2015.   
 
While these alternative approaches were prompted specifically by the 2015 election result they do 
not resolve the substantive methodological issues that have become apparent.  While we are 
assured that substituting UKIP as the third party or dividing the country into separate elements 
confirms rather than contradicts the standard approach for measuring three party bias it has raised a 
fundamental question about method selection (two - or three-party?) and the appropriate criteria 
for selecting parties for inclusion in the analysis.  This work is now underway and argues that 
because bias decomposition is chiefly concerned with the conversion of votes into seats it is the 
general outcome in respect of seat distributions rather than what may be happening in separate 
parts of the country that should ultimately determine the choice of method.  Following on from this 
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ƚŚĞĂŝŵŝƐƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐĨŽƌƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽŽŬĞƐ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞŝƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
for a range of different election results. 
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Table 1: Votes and Seats at the 2015 election  
 
Votes Votes% Change 
+/- Seats 
Change 
+/- 
     
Con 11,290,554 37.7 +0.8 330 +24 
Lab 9,347,273 31.2 +1.5 232 -26 
LD 2,415,916 8.1 -15.5 8 -49 
UKIP 3,862,775 12.9 +9.7 1 +1 
SNP 1,454,436 4.9 +3.2 56 +50 
Green 1,150,808 3.8 +2.9 1 - 
PC 181,704 0.6 +0.0 3 - 
Others 275,956 0.9 -2.6 1 - 
Total Vote 29,979,422   632  
Turnout 66.4%     
 
Note: Northern Ireland is excluded from these figures. 
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Table 2. The distribution of first and second places at the 2015 general election. 
Winning 
party 
Party in second place Total 
1st Con Lab LD UKIP Green PC SNP Ind/Oth 
         
Con  207 46 75   1 1 330 
Lab 168  9 44 4 5 1 1 232 
LD 4 2    1 1  8 
UKIP 1        1 
Green  1       1 
PC 1 2       3 
SNP 7 41 8      56 
Total 2nd 181 253 63 120 4 6 3  631 
 
Note: Total sums to 631 EHFDXVHWKH6SHDNHU¶VVHDWRI%XFNLQJKDPLVH[FOXGHGDQGDOVRWKHVHDWVLQ1RUWKHUQ
Ireland. 
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Table 3: Decomposition of electoral bias at 2010 and 2015 general elections 
  Conservative Labour LD 
 2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015 
Geography +36 +28 +31 -10 -74 -20 
Electorate -7 -8 +6 +7 +1 +3 
Abstention -11 -12 +13 +16 -6 -4 
Minor 
party -2 +1 +2 -2 -1 +1 
Net 
interactions -3 -5 +11 +0 +4 +1 
Total bias 13 6 63 12 -76 -19 
 
  
21 
 
 
Table 4: The changing distribution of ineffective votes 2005-2015 
 
 
Seats 
won 
(a) 
 Votes per 
seat won 
(b) 
Ineffective 
votes per 
seat won 
% (b) 
of (a) 
(c)  
Total 
Surplus 
votes 
(d)  
Total 
Wasted 
votes 
Total 
Ineffective 
votes (sum of 
(c) and (d) ) Total votes 
Con 
2005 210 41,820 27,872 66.6 1,651,370 4,201,719 5,853,089 8,782,197 
2010 306 34,979 20,596 58.9 2,898,033 3,404,308 6,302,341 10,703,720 
2015 330 34,214 21,845 63.8 4,275,307 2,933,385 7,208,692 11,290,554 
Lab 
2005 348 27,450 16,518 60.2 2,776,533 2,971,894 5,748,427 9,552,436 
2010 258 33,359 21,886 65.6 2,041,068 3,605,596 5,646,664 8,606,525 
2015 232 40,289 29,211 72.5 2,443,509 4,333,477 6,776,986 9,347,003 
Lib 
Dem 
2005 62 96,540 81,816 84.7 321,967 4,750,631 5,072,598 5,985,454 
2010 57  119,942  103,913  86.6 318,040 5,604,975 5,923,015 6,836,718 
2015 8 302,012 288,945 95.7 31,192 2,280,364 2,311,556 2,416,096 
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Table 5: Electorate measures for 2015 general election 
Winner 2015 N seats Electorate Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Conservative 330 45,525 108,804 73,324 6,775 
Labour 232 49,821 91,987 69,514 8,152 
Lib Dem 8 34,552 72,351 61,894 12,391 
Other (incl Speaker) 62 21,769 86,955 69,262 10,797 
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Table 6: General election turnout in 2015 by winning party 
Winner 2015 
 N seats Min  Max Mean 
Std 
Dev 
Conservative Turnout  330 57.0 77.3 68.7 3.4 
Change10/15  -8.7 17.7 0.4 2.1 
Labour Turnout 232 51.3 75.6 61.9 4.6 
Change10/15  -6.3 10.4 0.7 2.5 
Lib Dem Turnout 8 65.5 76.7 70.1 3.9 
Change10/15  -2.6 7.3 1.7 3.5 
Other (incl Speaker) Turnout 62 55.4 81.9 70.6 5.1 
Change10/15  -1.9 11.8 6.8 2.7 
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Table 7: Decomposition of three-party electoral bias with the inclusion of UKIP 
 Con Lab UKIP 
Geography 15 23 -28 
Electorate -8 7 2 
Abstention -13 12 0 
Minor party 6 -3 -2 
Net interactions 0 0 0 
Total bias 0 38 -28 
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Table 8: Comparing three-party electoral bias in Scotland and England & Wales 
 Scotland England & Wales 
 SNP Lab Con Con Lab LD 
Geography 3 -1 0 16 5 -20 
Electorate 0 0 0 -8 5 2 
Abstention 0 0 0 -12 14 -4 
Minor party 1 0 0 2 -2 0 
Net interactions 1 0 1 -3 3 3 
Total bias 4 -1 1 -4 +27 -19 
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Figure 1: Ineffective votes: (a) Conservative, (b) Labour and (c) Liberal Democrats 
 
  
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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Figure 2: Ordered parliamentary constituency vote shares (a) Conservative, (b) Labour and (c) Liberal 
Democrats 
 
(b) 
30-40% range: LAB won 20 of 117 seats (17.1% success) 
(c) 
30-40% range: LD won 5 of 28 seats (17.9% success) 
(a) 
30-40% range: CON won 18 of 76 seats (23.7% success) 
